

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Op-23X

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NAVY AND ARMY Declassification/Release Instructions on File

20 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR General Vandenberg.

Subject: Joint Army and Navy Intelligence.

Enclosures: (A) Description of Organizational Units.
(B) Estimated Naval Personnel and Civilian Employees
Including Space Requirements for Same.
(C) Tabulated Data Pertaining to Organizational Units.

1. ONI has completed its initial studies along the lines previously discussed with General Craig with a view to determining what elements (organizational units) of ONI are susceptible of Joint effort.

2. For convenience in analysis, the activities will be presented in four groups as follows:

- A. Operational Intelligence
- B. Associated Activities (Administrative, Training, Translating, etc.)
- C. Foreign Intelligence
- D. Domestic Intelligence

3. A brief statement and description of activities (organizational units) by groups is given in Enclosure (A). Included therein is an indication for each activity as to classification, i.e., whether it is considered, "Exclusively Departmental," "susceptible of joint effort," etc., as described in Enclosure (A) to my memorandum to Op-09 of about 14 January 1946, a copy of which was furnished to General Craig.

4. Estimated space and personnel requirements for the Naval contingent is given in Enclosure (B).

5. All data pertaining to organizational units is tabulated and summarized in Enclosure (C).

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6. An examination of the groups of intelligence activities set forth in Enclosure (A) indicates the following:

- a. Group (A) - Operational Intelligence.
This group is entirely departmental and not considered susceptible of joint effort.
- b. Group (B) - Associated Activities.
While some parts of this group are considered exclusively departmental, still, many activities are susceptible of joint effort especially if a considerable portion of the activities of Group (C) (Foreign Intelligence) are eventually merged.
- c. Group (C) - Foreign Intelligence.
Some of these fields of endeavor under this group should be allotted to the service having primary interest. However, a large portion of this group is considered susceptible of joint effort.
- d. Group (D) - Domestic Intelligence.
Some of the activities of this group are considered exclusively departmental; others are suitable for joint effort, but practically such merging is rendered difficult because of major differences in organization, within the Army and Navy for handling these fields. Reorganization of Army methods to give centralized control would be necessary for merging in this field as Navy has no counterpart of Army Service, ground and air forces organizations. Some improvement might be achieved by new legislation establishing a National Security Service to handle such activities as Registry, Alien Control, Examination of Credentials, Travel Control, Subversive Activities and Counter Espionage; thereby profiting by the experience of the British in this field.

7. Because of the exclusive departmental character of Group (A), the comparative lesser susceptibility of joint effort of Group (D), it is suggested that our first efforts be directed toward the merging of Groups (B) and (C), i.e., Associated Activities and Foreign Intelligence.

8. It is suggested that Army make similar studies of their intelligence activities, upon completion of which, it is recommended that a joint committee be appointed for the following purposes:

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- (a) Compare Army and Navy studies, inquire into differences and make final recommendations as to activities to be merged.
- (b) Make recommendations as to organization for merged activities to include logical groups which should each be controlled by a Director.
- (c) Summarize total personnel and space requirements and make further recommendations as to location of merged activities.
- (d) Study and make recommendations as to new filing system and disposition of old files.
- (e) Study and make recommendations as to a merger schedule, i.e., what activities or groups of activities should be merged first, etc., or should all be merged at one time and when.

9. It is suggested that the committee be composed of six members, two to be designated by each G-2, A-2 and ONI.

10. As soon as the extent of merger has been decided upon, it is suggested that a standard form for report should be adopted and a new intelligence directive (or index guide) be drawn up, approved and published. This proposed directive should be suitable to the needs of all Departments concerned with foreign intelligence.

11. The personnel estimates given in Enclosures (B) and (C) are based on the expected peace time allowance for ONI which is dependent on legislation and Navy plans. A larger number will be available until 1 September 1946.

12. It is believed that the most effective merging of Army and Navy intelligence activities can be secured only if they are housed together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their operational departments. If the JCS are not in the same location, more activities and personnel will have to be kept in the Navy Department to serve CNO and it is presumed that the same will be true for the Chief of Staff.

13. It should be understood that the enclosed study is merely exploratory and should in no way be considered a firm commitment. I shall be glad to discuss this further with you at your convenience.

THOS. B. INGLIS.

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